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VANDERBILT
VOLUmE 13

LAW REVIEW
JUNE, 1960

NUMBER 3

WRONGFUL DEATH-BASES OF THE COMMON LAW RULES*
T. A. SMEDLEY**

One of the oft-sung glories of the English common law is the
vitality of its many rules which evolved originally from ancient custom, usage, tradition and experience. This truly amazing vitality has
the virtue of imbuing the law with stability, of providing legal sanction for established commercial practices, of protecting vested property
interests, and of furnishing some measure of predictability of decisions. Unfortunately, it also serves to perpetuate the force of some
rules far beyond the period of their usefulness and to maintain their
influence after the reason for their existence has been long forgotten.'
Such was the case in regard to two common law principles which
for century after century prevented any recovery of damages for
bodily injuries wrongfully inflicted on a person and resulting in his
death. These principles, overlapping in their effect and often confused in their application, but not identical, are: (1) actio personals
moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person (of
plaintiff or defendant), and (2) the killing of a human being is not a
ground for an action for damages. Due to these two restrictions,
when a person died either instantly or after an interval of time as a
consequence of the wrongful act or omission of another, the wrongdoer could not be held liable either (1) to the victim's estate for
damages sustained by the victim before death or for damages to his
estate due to the loss of life, or (2) to third parties with interests
in the life of the victim for damages for their losses resulting from his
death.2 The modern law regarding recovery of damages for wrongful
death represents the results of a long judicial and legislative process
of qualification, limitation and finally abrogation of these principles.
* This is the first of a series of articles to be published by the author on
wrongful death and survival of personal injury actions.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Director, Race Relations Law
Reporter; member of the Illinois and Virginia Bars.
1. "What may have been the real reason for the establishment of this rule
of the common law [denying recovery for wrongful death] we may not be
able to discover ....In that case the rule must be held to be one originally
created for some legal reason which in the mutation of things has crumbled
away, leaving the rule so crystallized as to be immovable except by legislative power .... It is in this sense I think that the rule has been accepted
as law in this country." Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317, 13
Atl. 233, 235 (1888).
2. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 93 (1935); 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES 3694 (3d ed.
1904); TiFFANY, DEATH By WRONGFUL ACT § 1 (2d ed. 1913).
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I. ORIGIN OF AcTIo PERSONALIS MAXIM

In spite of the long life and great effect of the rules barring recovery for wrongful death, neither their exact origins nor bases can
be definitely fixed. It seems safe to say that the broad maxim actio
personalismoritur cum persona is the source of the prohibition against
recovery, but English legal historians have encountered difficulty in
tracing the development of the maxim. Goudy conceded that "though
this is one of the most familiar maxims of English law, the veil of
obscurity covers not only its origin but its true import and significance"; 3 and Pollock observed that the rule is "one of some antiquity,
but its origin is obscure and post-classical." 4
Apparently neither Roman law nor Canon law can be blamed for
the incorporation of the rule into English common law,5 though it is
said that a similar concept is to be found in Roman jurisprudence.
Plucknett reports that the principle had medieval origins in England,7
but there is no reference to the maxim itself in the writings of Glanville (12th century) or Bracton (13th century).8 In the fifteenth century Year Books, several cases are referred to as stating that an
executor could not be held liable for a trespass of his testator because
the action dies with the person. 9 But it is commonly believed that
the maxim did not gain currency, at least "in its modern shape," until
the time of Lord Coke,' 0 who quoted it both in cases reported by him
and in his writings." In the middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone stated the rule more fully and "in its modern shape": "And in
actions merely personal, arising ex delicto, for wrongs actually done
or committed by the defendant, as trespass, battery, and slander, the
rule is that actio personalis moritur cum persona; and it never shall be
revived either by or against the executors or other representatives."1 2
3. GouDy, ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 218 (1913),

quoted in 3 HOLDSWORTH,

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 576 (3d ed. 1923). See also PROSSER, TORTS 706
(2d ed. 1955).
4. POLLOCK, TORTS 63 (13th ed. 1939), quoting Bowen, L.J., in Finlay v.
Chirney, 20 Q.B.D. 494, 502 (1888).
5. 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 576; Winfield, Death As Affecting
Liability in Tort, 29 COLum. L. REv. 239, 244 (1929).

6. POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 63. See Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S.
209,211 (1924).
7. PL-uCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 376 (5th ed. 1956),

referring to III Aethelred 14 (c. 997).
8. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 239-42.
9. 3 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 577, citing Y.B. Hil. 11 Hen. 4, pl.
20 (1410) and Y.B. Pasch. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 10 (1440). Y.B. Mich. 18 Edw. 4, pl.
17 (1478), applies this reasoning to a suit for trespass by a representative of
the deceased plaintiff. See Winfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 244.
10. 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 576; Winfield, op. cit. supra note
5, at 244-45.

11. Pinchon's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 866, 87a, 77 Eng. Rep. 859 (1609); 4 CoKE's

INSTITUTES 315 (1797).

FULBECKE'S PARALLELE (1601), Noy's MAxMSs

and WENTWORTH'S EXECUTOR'S (1641)

(1641)

all carried statements of the maxim.

See Winfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 245-46.
12. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302.

1960]

WRONGFUL DEATH

Though the earlier authorities stated the maxim broadly, and though
the term actio personalis itself would include other than damages
actions sounding in tort, it is agreed that the restrictive principle
generally did not extend to contract actions (except contracts to
marry) even in its very early application, nor to tort actions for the
recovery of possession of chattels or realty.13
The reason for the existence of the maxim, like the date of its
origin, is the subject of considerable conjecture among legal scholars,
some of whom have reached somewhat negative conclusions. Pollock
characterized the rule as "one of the least rational parts of our law,"
and declared that when damages recoveries came to be understood as
compensatory rather than punitive in purpose, "the rule actio personalis moritur cum persona seems to be without plausible ground."'14
Plucknett discloses his opinion as to the merits of the rule by observing tersely: "Our remarks about this famous brocard can happily
take the form of an obituary notice."' 5 The Tennessee Supreme Court
has declared that "no reason has ever been assigned for the existence
of this rule which would satisfy an enlightened court of modem
6
times.'
At least one scholar suggests that the introduction of the maxim
into the English common law may not be attributable to rational bases
but rather to "a hasty following of the Roman rule"; 7 but differences
in the statusof human beings under the Roman and English cultures
are said to make the uncritical adoption of the Roman rule into the
English law unjustifiable.18 Most legal historians agree that the rule
arose mainly from the early confusion of the role of civil damages
actions with the punitive aspects of criminal proceedings. Thus,
Winfield, searching for the reason for the denial of remedies in tort
after one party was dead, concludes:
Perhaps it was the criminal hue that coloured trespass for such a long
time. Crime is a very personal matter. Death pays all when the criminal
has gone. "The party cannot be punished when he is dead." And even
13. Contracts: Ibid; 3 HoLDswoR-r, op cit. supra note 3, at 577; PIGGOTT,
TORTS 19 (1885); PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 376. Tort actions for the
recovery of property: POLLOCK, TORTS 52 (15th ed. 1951).
14. POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 62, 64.
15. PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 376. This observation was made just
after the English Law Reform Act of 1934 finally abrogated the rule in England. See Fisher, Survival of Actions, 20 Am. L. Rsv. 48, 57 (1886): "The
maxim would probably never have acquired such currency if people had not
thought that a Latin quotation was an ornament to an opinion or argument."
16. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 582, 162 S.W. 584, 586
(1913). "The maxim... is by no means a favorite with the courts. It has no
champion at this date, nor has any judge or law writer risen to defend it for
200 years past." 128 Tenn. at 581, 162 S.W. at 586.
17. POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 63. See also Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1937); PIGGOr, TORTS 19 (1885).

18. See Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Boiton, 32 L.Q. REv.
431, 436-37 (1916).
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if he survives, and it is the injured party who has died, surely it is the
king and not the representatives who should take up redress.19
In the same vein, Pollock observed:
At one time it may have been justified by the vindictive and quasicriminal character of suits for civil injuries. A process which is still
felt to be a substitute for private war may seem incapable of being
continued on behalf of or against a dead man's estate, an impersonal
abstraction represented no doubt by one or more living persons, but by
persons who need not be of kin to the deceased. Some such feeling
seems to be implied in the dictum, "If one doth a trespass to me, and
dieth, the action is dead also, because it should be inconvenient to recover
against one who was not party to the wrong."2 0

So long as the recovery of damages was regarded as a matter of
personal vengeance and punishment as between the transgressor and

his victim, death erased the purpose of a civil action between them.
The legal successor of the deceased party was neither the wronged
nor the wrongdoer and had no personal involvement in the wrong.
"For neither the executors of the plaintiff have received, nor those
of the defendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any
manner of wrong or injury."2' 1
Some reasons of a more practical nature have been advanced, often
rather faint-heartedly, in justification of the operation of the maxim.
It is suggested that difficulties of proof may arise from the fact that
one of the interested parties is not available to testify as to his side
of the case, and that an unjust result may be reached because of the
insufficiency of the evidence2
Also, the successors of a deceased
plaintiff cannot actually show that defendant's wrong caused loss to
themselves or to the deceased's estate, except on the basis of the
unprovable assumption that if the deceased had not died he would
have sued on the cause of action, recovered substantial damages, and
19. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 249. The interior quote is from Fineux,
C.J., in Y.B. Mich. 12 Hen. 8, pl. 3 (1520). See also PRossER, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 706.
20. PoLLocx, op. cit. supra note 4, at 63, 64. The interior quote is from
Newton, C.J., in Y.B.-19 Hen. 6, pl. 10 (1440).
21. 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 302 (Emphasis added). See also
Ellenborough, C.J., in Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408, 415, 105 Eng.
Rep. 433, 436 (1814): "The general rule of law is actio personalis moritur
cum persona, under which rule are included all actions for injuries merely
personal. Executors and administrators are representatives of the temporal
property, that is, the debts and goods of the deceased, but not of their wrongs,
except where those wrongs operate to the temporal injury of their personal
estate."

22. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 249. But as the author observes, the
same difficulty arises where the action is based on a tort against property, to
which the maxim did not apply (at least not in England after a statute passed
in 1833). And the same observation applies to contract actions, to which the
maxim never applied.
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retained that recovery as part of his estate until he eventually died. 3
Further, where the injured person is dead and therefore cannot himself be compensated, the measure of damages which would have been
proper in an action he would have brought had he lived, may not
provide an appropriate amount of compensation for his estate and
those succeeding to his assets. All these factors are summed up in a
cautious aside in a late edition of an English torts text:
A slender case might be made out for the old law on the ground that,
in the absence of the essential parties, it is difficult to ensure that justice
is done; and, in the case of the death of the injured party, there is much
to be said for the view that the measure of damages ought to change,
so far as personal injury is concerned, when there is no longer anyone to
compensate. It certainly seems to be a departure from the compensatory
basis of the law of civil wrongs to award damages to a person who has
not been damaged... 24
While these latter considerations may carry some weight, the explanation for the development of the maxim apparently lies in the
historical factor first mentioned, and thus Pollock's observation is
borne out that when the function of damages awards came to be
recognized as compensatory rather than punitive, the reason for the
rule ceased to exist.

II. ORIGIN OF RULE AGAINST CIvIL ACTION FOR KILLING
Attempts to establish the origin and basis of the companion principle, that no civil action lies for damages for wrongfully causing the
death of a person, also leads to some degree of ambiguity and to
dependence more on historical considerations than on logical reasons.
Though it is frequently assumed that this broad restriction is merely
one aspect of the operation of the rule that personal actions die with
the person, careful analysis shows that such is not the case. Rather,
the rule in its broadest application appears to have been finally confirmed in the common law at a relatively late date, and largely by
judicial accident.
Certain it is that at one early stage of English history, something
like damages for the killing of a person were payable to the deceased's
relatives, as a means of preventing the latter from wreaking vengeance on the killer and his family by a blood feud. Under medieval
Anglo-Saxon law this punitive payment, called "wer" or "wergild"
("mans-price" or "man-payment"), was paid by the killer to the kinsmen of the victim, the amount being fixed first by some kind of arbitration and later by an established scale of payments based on the
23. Id. at 250: "[Plaintiff's successors] seek to set up a principle consonant
neither with abstract justice nor with the law of torts,-that they shall profit
by a wrong which in origin did not harm them."
24. POLtLOCK, op. cit. supra note 13, at 53, n. 30.
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social rank of the deceased. Acceptance of wergild put the recipients
under obligation not to pursue the feud; and ultimately, as the community's interest in preventing breaches of the peace became dominant, the wrongdoer and the victim's kindred were placed under the
respective duties of paying and accepting wergild instead of engaging
in private war.2 5 However, it is probable that such payments were
conceived of more as punishment for the wrong than as compensation
for losses suffered and were imposed by the sovereign as a police
measure to preserve the peace rather than as a recognition of legal
rights of the deceased's kinsmen.
Even in the later period when the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona was becoming established in the common law, the
restriction against recovery of damages for wrongful death was only
partially formulated and narrowly expressed.6 Nevertheless, it is
not uncommon to find courts indulging in the broad assumption that
this restriction originated as a part of the maxim. Thus, the declaration is made in an early Kentucky case: "The cause of action for
injuries to the person dies with the person injured, and it follows
as a necessary consequence, that the cause of action having itself
abated no separate action can be maintained for such damages, as are
exclusively consequential." 27 The fault of this position is that it assumes too much. True it is that at common law the maxim would
apply to preclude an action for damages by the decedent's personal
representatives to recover for the losses of the decedent, for in such
a case the decedent, through his representative, must be the party
plaintiff and his death extinguishes the cause of action. But the death
may have caused other losses to third parties who had an interest
in the continuance of the life of the decedent-his dependents, who
anticipated his support, his creditors, who sought payment of his
obligations, his employer, who had a contract right to the benefit
of his services, his spouse, who expected to enjoy his companionship,
protection and devotion. 28 These losses are separate from those sustained by the decedent himself. They provide the bases for independent causes of action for damages, and in respect to these actions the
25. See 1 POLLOCK &MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 46-48 (2d ed.
1923); 2 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 37, 51-52.
26. See Smith v. Sykes, 1 Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (1677); Higgins v.
Butcher, Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607). The specific rule of these decisions
and the reasons therefor are discussed inira.
27. Eden v. Lexington & F. R.R., 53 Ky. 165, 167 (1853). See also St. Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 655 (1915); Holmes v. 0. & C. Ry., 5 Fed.
75, 78 (D.C. Ore. 1880); Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb. 9, 17 (N.Y.
1858).
28. In a few instances the insurer of the decedent has sought (unsuccessfully) to recover damages from the party causing his death, on the theory that
the insurer had a pecuniary interest in the continued life of the insured.
Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
New York & N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856).
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parties are the wrongdoer and the third party. Neither of them being
dead, the rule that a personal action dies with the person has no application.29 However, the failure of counsel and judges in some cases
to notice the distinction between the losses of the decedent and the
losses of third parties very probably promoted the widespread acceptance of the rule denying recovery for either type of loss.30
Obviously, then, it is necessary to look further for reasons for
denying any recovery of damages resulting from the wrongful killing
of a person. The search leads back along the dim corridors of the
development of English criminal law, and some authors have with
some justification dispaired of finding a path of logic through the maze
of ancient customs. Thus, it has been said: "The reasons assigned
for such a rule are not always the same nor are they always satisfactory, and the principle has been recognized by American courts more
because of the fact that it is firmly established by precedent than because it is based upon any sufficient reason. '' 31 Even judges have been
known to indulge in glittering ambiguities when approaching this
problem: "It is manifestly not one reason but many, which lie at the
basis of the common law rule. Considerations of the most varied and
grave character would present themselves to the minds of any court
* . ' to dissuade them from entertaining any action, sounding in
damages and seeking a recovery on account of the destruction of
life."3
Actually, the considerations on which the rule seems to have been
originated were neither varied nor grave, but rather were centered
in a single technical device in the medieval English criminal lawthe doctrine of the merger of a civil wrong in a felony.3 The relation
of this doctrine to the matter of recovery of damages for wrongful
death was stated concisely early in the seventeenth century in Higgins
v. Butcher.34 In that case a husband brought an action for damages
29. The distinction is generally recognized by textwriters, and is sometimes,
though not frequently enough, spelled out clearly in judicial opinions.
Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 354 (1854); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 188-89
(1867); Bramwell, B., dissenting in Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 94 (1873);
POLLOCK, TORTS 66 (9th ed. 1912); PRossER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 709;
SALMOND, TORTS 392 (11th ed. 1953); SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3695;
TiFFANY, op. cit. supranote 2, at §§ 1, 15.
30. See SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 29, at 392; 3 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 333-35.
31. BAUER, DAMAGEs 414 (1919). See also, Holmes v. 0. & C. R.R., supra
note 27, at 78: "It is also admitted that the weight of authority in this country
is with the English rule. But it is not admitted that the rule is founded in
reason or is consonant with justice."
32. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., supra note 28,
at 272.
33. The doctrine apparently developed as a phase of the establishment of
the king's power to seize the property of felons and impose the forfeiture of
goods, as well as life, to the crown as punishment for such offenses. See 3
HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 329-33.

34. Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607).
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for an assault on his wife by the defendant. The wife had died the
day following the assault as a result of the beating she received, and
the husband had thus been deprived of her services, for which loss
he sought recovery. Though defendant's counsel argued that the action
would not lie because, the tort being personal to the wife, the cause
of action died with her, the court did not base its decision for defendant on that ground. Rather, it declared, "if a man beats the
servant of J. S. so that he dies of that battery, the master shall not
have an action against the other for the battery and loss of the service,
because the servant dying of the extremity of the battery, it is now
become an offence to the Crown, being converted into felony, and that
drowns the particular offence, and private wrong offer'd to the
master before, and his action is thereby lost . . . ."5 In a similar case
decided seventy years later, the same principle was stated even more
succinctly: "[I]f A beat the wife of B, so that she dies, B can have no
action of the case for that; because it is criminal, and of a higher
nature."36 Under this state of the law, if the wrongdoing amounted to
a felony, the authority of the sovereign pre-empted the whole case,
and no civil right of action could exist.3 7 And since the unjustifiable
killing of a human being nearly always amounted to felonious homicide during the early period under consideration,3 the merger doctrine
virtually eliminated the possibility of recovering damages for losses
sustained by third parties with an interest in the life of the decedent.
At a later time the doctrine was qualified so that the private wrong
was not entirely destroyed by merger into the felony but only suspended until criminal prosecution for the public wrong had been
accomplished. 39 But this modification had little effect in the wrongful
death cases because as long as the punishment for felonious homicide
was both execution and forfeiture of property there would be no way
to enforce any damages judgment obtained by pursuing the suspended
civil cause of action after a successful criminal prosecution. Under
such conditions, "an action for the private injury was useless and
absurd." 4 And even at times and in situations in which neither
35. Ibid.
36. Smith v. Sykes, 1 Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (1677). See 4 BAcKSTONE, COMMENTAIES *6: "In these gross and atrocious injuries the private

wrong is swallowed up in the public ......
37. Recognition of this rule as controlling in the English law at the time of
Higgins v. Butcher and into the nineteenth century is found in many decisions
of various courts. See, e.g., Shields v. Yonge, supra note 29; Eden v. Lexington & F. R.R., supra note 27; Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475
(1848); Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29; Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., supra
note 1; Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38 (1916).
38. See id. at 45, 46; HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 433.
39. See HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 433-34; Shields v. Yonge,
supra note 29, at 353; Green v. Hudson River R.R., supra note 27, at 17; Wells
v. Abrahams, L.R. 7 Q.B. 554, 557 (1872).
40. Grosso v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., supra note 1, at 234. Hyatt v. Adams,
supra note 29, at 185; White v. Fort, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 251, 263, 265 (1824).
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merger nor forfeiture of property were involved, it was still sometimes
asserted that as a matter of public policy the civil cause of action
should be suspended until after the wrongdoer had been prosecuted
for the criminal offense. This policy was intended to persuade injured
parties to institute criminal proceedings in order that the public's
interest in having the offender punished for his crime should be
served. 41 Of course, under this theory of suspension, and absent the
practice of forfeiture of property for felony, the common-law restriction against suits by third parties damaged in wrongful death
cases logically would not be operative after the criminal prosecution
had been completed, either by conviction or acquittal of the accused
-and this point was suggested as far back as 1677 by the reporter of
Smith v. Sykes. 42 However, by the time suspension had fully replaced
merger and the practice of forfeiture of property had been finally
abandoned, the rule of law arising out of the existence of merger and
forfeiture was so firmly entrenched that the courts generally felt
43
unable to disturb it.
The Higgins and Smith cases, decided in the seventeenth century,
perhaps originated and certainly clearly evidenced the existence of
the common-law rule that when a person was killed under circumstances in which the killing was a felony and in which the
Crown's remedy was pre-emptive, no civil cause of action for damages
existed. But the authority regularly cited for the proposition that no
damages are recoverable for wrongful death is not those cases, but
rather Baker v. Bolton, decided in 1808, in which Lord Ellenborough,
without referring to any authority, declared broadly: "In a civil
court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an

injury."""
An amazing variety of reactions have been manifested to this case.
The decision has been vigorously defended on occasion as stating a
rule which "has become inveterate from the earliest time,"' ' but it has
See 4 BL cKSTONE, op. cit. supranote 12, at 6.
41. See Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29, at 187: "his is but a suspension of
the civil remedy until the offender has been tried for the public offense; and
it is based upon grounds of public policy,, making it the interest of parties
who have suffered the private injury to prosecute the offender, to perform their
duties to the public before they seek private redress." See also Eden v.
Lexington & F. R.R., supra note 27, at 166; White v. Fort, supra note 39, at
262-66; Crosby v. Leng, 12 East. 409, 413, 104 Eng. Rep. 160 (1810) (Ellenborough, C.J.).
42. See note 26 supra at 160 n. (a): "But quaere, if an action will not lie after
the defendant has been criminally prosecuted?"
43. See Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1877); Green v. Hudson
River R.R., supra note 27, at 15; Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, supra
note 37, at 41.
44. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
45. Earl Loreburn in Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Arnerika, supra note 37, at
41. Lord Sumner, in the same case at page 53, said of the decision: "Plainly
it was, and long had been, the general opinion among students of the common
law that the rule was as stated by Lord Ellenborough."
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also been widely criticized as embodying a careless overstatement of
the law, made without any supporting authority and induced by
confusion of thought. 46 In connection with his ruling in this case, Lord
Ellenborough has been hailed as a great jurist on the one hand47 and
on the other has been branded as one "whose forte was never common sense." 48 And while the rule laid down has been deplored as one
which unduly restricted the recovery of damages in wrongful death
cases, 49 the decision has also been commended as opening the door
to recovery of one item of damages which had not been obtainable
previously in such cases.50
One can hardly be entirely confident in placing an evaluation on a
decision which has been the subject of such widely variant construction, but it seems probable that Lord Ellenborough unwittingly (or,
if deliberately, wholly without authority) phrased his rule too broadly
and thereby caused the restriction against recovery to be extended
to a degree not warranted by the earlier decisions. 51 It must be remembered that Baker v. Bolton was a nisi prius case, tried in the
local court before a single judge rather than en banc in the superior
court at Westminster. The case involved only a small amount of
money and apparently was not extensively argued. Ellenborough's
reported opinion is very brief, and the controversial rule of law
was laid down without either sustaining reasoning or supporting
46. See Bramwell, B., in Osborn v. Gillett, supra note 29, at 96: "This is
only a nisi prius case .... No argument is stated, no authority cited, and I
cannot set a high value on the case .... ." See also 3 HoULSWORTH, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 335: "I should like to suggest, therefore, that when Lord
Ellenborough gave his ruling in Baker v. Bolton he was the victim of the
same confusion of ideas." And SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 29, at 393, quoting
Holdsworth: "The rule as laid down by Lord Ellenborough is obviously unjust; it is technically unsound because .

.

. it is based upon a misreading of

legal history ......
47. Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, supra note 37, at 51, takes note of
"the weight of Lord Ellenborough's name (no mean authority even when
sitting at nisi prius . . )."; Green v. Hudson River R.R., supra note 27, at 16,

observes that though the decision was made at nisi prius, "it has the sanction
of the great name of Lord Ellenborough."

48. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 709. See Lord Sumner's opinion in
Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, supra note 37, at 51, referring to "Lord
Campbell's sneer" against Lord Ellenborough.
49. See HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 434-35, and discussion in the
text following note 51 infra.
50. Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29, at 189. The basis of this peculiar evaluation is that Ellenborough ruled that the husband could recover damages
for losses suffered because of his wife's injury, from the time of the injury to
the time of the death, whereas the Michigan court understood that prior cases
had prohibited any action for damages for a wrongful act which caused
death.
51. The most persuasive criticism of the Baker v. Bolton rule is presented
by HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331-36, and Holdsworth, op. cit. supra
note 18. The other side of the argument is best stated in Admiralty Comm'rs
v. S.S. Amerika, supra note 37. However, one of the proponents himself concedes that the rule of the case may appear anomalous to "the scientific jurist,"
and that it must be explained on "historical grounds." Id. at 50. See Rose
v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 834, deploring the "illogical doctrine of The Amerika."
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authority. Under the circumstances it is understandable how the

judge could have stated his ruling incautiously so that it declared
absolutely that no action for damages could arise from the death of
a person. This overstatement may have resulted either from confusion
concerning the affect of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona or from unwarranted assumptions regarding the merger
doctrine.
As to the first explanation, it is to be noted that the maxim should
not apply to the Baker case because the plaintiff was the decedent's
husband suing for damages for his own losses caused by the wife's
death. Neither party to the action was dead. However, since the
plaintiff was the closest relative of the decedent, he was probably her
administrator also, and thus was the proper party to sue for decedent's
own losses sustained from the wrongful death, which action would of
course be barred by the maxim. In the haste of deciding a briefly
argued and seemingly insignificant case, the court may easily have
thought of the action as being of the latter nature and therefore not
maintainable under a common law rule of several centuries' standing.
The second possibility is even more credible. The earlier Higgins
and Smith cases had established the law as denying a civil remedy to a
third person who suffered loss as a result of a killing which amounted
to felonious homicide. Notice carefully, as Lord Ellenborough may
not have done, that in both opinions the denial of remedy was predicated on the wrongdoing being "an offense of the Crown," a "felony,"
a "criminal" act. Without such a wrongdoing, the doctrine of merger
would obviously not operate because if the act causing the death was
justifiable or constituted only a misdemeanor the sovereign's power
to execute the killer and cause a forfeiture of his property could not
be invoked. In the Baker case, the wife's death resulted from the
negligent driving of a stagecoach in which she was a passenger; and
there is no indication that the wrong amounted to a felony by the
driver, or, if it did, that the owners of the coach line against whom
the suit was brought would be responsible under the criminal law for
the driver's conduct.52 Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the
merger doctrine was still in effect so. as to destroy a civil cause of
action in England by 1808. 53 The opinion in the Baker case contains
no reference to either of these factors, and the suspicion is thus
52. See Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29, at 190; Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W.

R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317, 13 Atl. 233, 234 (1888); Osborn v. Gillett, supra note 29, at

92, 100.
53. SALmOND, op. cit. supra note 29, at 392: 'The latter rule seems to be
based in so far as it refers to inability to recover for the loss of services by
the infliction of death on the principle that a trespass is merged in a felony,
a reason inadequate in Lord Ellenborough's time, and now obsolete." (Emphasis added). See Rose v. Ford, supra note 51, at 834. The civil remedy may
have been suspended until a criminal prosecution for the felony had been
completed. See HoumswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 332-33.
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warranted that the case was decided wrongly and that the rule recited
was a mistaken application of the narrower rule adopted in the
Higgins case on different facts and under different conditions.
As has been indicated, a number of English authorities have
questioned the accuracy of the rule in the Baker case; but the English
courts followed it, apparently without deviation, until later statutes
intervened to alter the law. In America a few early cases ignored or
repudiated the restriction against recovery of the losses of third
parties resulting from wrongful deaths,5 but these decisions were
largely discredited and the state and federal courts generally acquiesced in the broad proposition that "at common law, no civil action
could be maintained for the death of a human being, caused by the
wrongful act or negligence of another, or for any damages suffered by
any person in consequence of such death ....
-55 However, though the
rule was accepted, the opinions often noted that the reasons for the
creation of the rule-even if they may have been sound in England at
one time-could not rationally be applied in American jurisprudence
in the nineteenth century. In some instances, the mere fact of the
apparently long existence of the rule as settled law was accepted as
justification for its continued application to later cases;5 6 but some
courts felt it necessary to seek other bases for sustaining an established rule which had been deprived of its original support by political
developments and the passage of time. While engaged in this process,
a Michigan judge, referring to the merger doctrine as the basis for the
denial of recovery of damages in a wrongful death case, made an
observation so pointed as to have since pierced the heart of many a
law teacher: "But this reason thus nakedly stated, resting upon artificial distinction rather than any real principle, and savoring more of
54. Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R., 23 Fed. Cas. 368 (No. 13,599) (C.C. Neb.
1874) (discredited by Insurance Co. v. Brame, supra note 28); Cross v.
Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794) (ignored by court in reaching contrary
result in Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., supra note

28); Shields v. Yonge, supra note 29 (approved by Chick v. Southwestern
R.R., 57 Ga. 357 (1876) and McDowell v. Georgia R.R., 60 Ga. 320 (1878));
Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. 1838) (overruled by Green v. Hudson
River R.R., supra note 27). See 1 JAGGARD, TORTS 327 (1895); TiFFANY, DEATH
BY WRONGFuL ACT

§§ 6-11 (2d ed. 1913).

55. Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29, at 185.
56. See, e.g., Grosso v. Delaware, L. &W. R.R., supra note 52, at 236: "[Tjhe
rule has become so solidified that whatever its original reason was, and
however such reason may have ceased to exist, it cannot be judicially disregarded or annulled, but, if injurious, its further modification must be sought
from legislative action." Green v. Hudson River R.R., supra note 27, at 15:
"But I suppose the question has been too long settled, both in England and
in this country, to be disturbed, and that it would savor somewhat more of
judicial knight errantry, than of legal prudence, to attempt to unsettle what
has been deemed at rest for more than two hundred and fifty years." Note
that this case was decided in 1858, only fifty years after Lord Ellenborough

created the rule referred to; the court, however, assumed that it was applying

the rule dating back to the Higgins case in 1607. Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55
Mass. (I Cush.) 475,478 (1848).
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the verbal logic of the schoolmen than of justice or common sense,
has not proved satisfactory .... -57

Unwilling to repudiate an established rule of law, but unsatisfied
with the historical bases for the rule, resourceful American judges
created several popular rationalizations for the refusal to recognize
any cause of action for damages for wrongful death. Some opinions
express something in the nature of moral compunctions against awarding damages for loss of life. This approach is best presented in the
Michigan case of Hyatt v. Adams, decided in 1848:
[Tihe reason of the rule is to be found in that natural and almost universal repugnance among enlightened nations to setting a price upon
human life, or any attempt to estimate its value by a pecuniary standard,
a repugnance which seems to have been strong and prevalent among
nations in proportion as they have been or become more enlightened and
refined, and especially so where the Christian religion has exercised its
most beneficient influence, and where human life has been held most
sacred. Among barbarous and half civilized nations, it has been common
to find a fixed and prescribed standard of value or compensation for
human life, which is often found to be carefully graduated by the relative importance of the position in the social scale which the deceased
may have occupied. While this has been the natural result, it has at the
same time been, to some extent, the cause of their inhuman customs,
their barbarous manners and social degradation, and of the comparatively
low estimate in which human life has been held among them.
To the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human life in the
light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of compensating its loss
in money is revolting.... 5 8
This may seem like strange talk in the light of the fact that civilized, Christian England had adopted Lord Campbell's Act two years
earlier to provide for recovery for dependents of persons killed by

the wrong of another, that Massachusetts and even Michigan already
had statutes granting similar rights in certain situations, and that all

American states would soon thereafter enact legislation similar to
Lord Campbell's Act. Nevertheless, other American courts echoed
the same sentiments. Thus, a Connecticut court took occasion to

deny that "death was a proper subject of pecuniary remuneration,"
and asserted that "from the nature of things" there could be no claim
for damages "in the right of the deceased."5 9 Both the New Jersey
and Ohio courts endorsed the proposition that "it is inconsistent with
the policy of the law to permit the value of human life to become
the subject of judicial computation .... ,60
57. Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 29, at 185.
58. Id. at 191-92.
59. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., supra note
28, at 272.
60. Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., supra note 52, at 235; Worley v.
Railroad Co., 1 Handy 481 (Ohio 1855).
What is perhaps a variation of this reasoning was urged on the court in
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In other instances courts have shifted their emphasis from principle

to practicalities by asserting that the impossibility of calculating the
pecuniary value of a life is the reason for denying recovery in wrongful death cases. 61 Since there was no logical basis for estimating in
dollars and cents the losses sustained, the jury could not be allowed
to make any award of damages, and so the law ought not to recognize
the existence of any such cause of action since it could only be prosecuted to futility. The thought is stated graphically, though from a
somewhat oblique angle in an early Connecticut case: "[F]or an
injury of such incalculable extent, writers on jurisprudence, perhaps
without strict accuracy, have assigned the awful magnitude of the
wrong as the reason why neither court nor jury have ever been
trusted by the law with the function of estimating it."62 But while
this became a favorite rationalization for the rule, it was criticised on
occasion by both courts and textwriters. A New York judge characterized this reasoning as "much more fanciful than sound, since there
are many wrongs, for the redress of which an action is given, but
which the instinctive sense of mankind declares are incapable of being measured by any pecuniary standard which can do more than
approach to a compensation. '63 And Pollock observed that courts
relying on this basis for the rule were in effect declaring that "because the compensation cannot be adequate there shall be no com64
pensation at all."
The extreme breadth of the liability which might be imposed on
the wrongdoer has been cited in justification of the denial of any
cause of action for wrongful death. The appalling plight of the tortfeasor has been presented in fervent terms in a Connecticut case:
[I]f a suit should be brought to recover for the mental suffering, loss of
society, comfort, support and protection resulting from the death of
another person, we should see at once, so intertwined is the web of human
affection, interest, and relationship, that the author of his death, however
slight or accidental his default, would be responsible in numberless
actions brought on behalf of wives, children, friends, brothers, sisters
and dependents of all degrees, to say nothing for the present of creditors ....
[As to recovery for loss of services contracted for] such are the compliOsborn v. Gillett, supra note 29, at 90: "The policy of the law refuses to
recognize the interest of one person in the death of another." Pollock observed that this reasoning would serve to make life insurance and leases for
lives illegal. POLLOcK, supra note 29, at 66.
61. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1937); Van
Amburg v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 650, 651 (1885); Green v.
Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb. 9, 17, 18 (N.Y. 1858).
62. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265,
273 (1856).
63. Green v. Hudson River R.R., supra note 61, at 18.
64. POLLOCK, TORTS 66 (9th ed. 1912). 1 JAGGARD, Op. cit. supra note 53, at
328, characterized the "public policy" arguments as "all unsatisfactory, if not
absurd, reasons."
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cations of human affairs, so endless and far-reaching the mutual promises
of man to man, in business and in matters of money and property, that
rarely is a death produced by a human agency, which does not affect the
pecuniary interest of those to whom the deceased was bound by contract.
To open the door of legal redress to wrongs received through the mere
voluntary and factitious relation of a contractor with the immediate subject of the injury, would be to encourage collusion and extravagant
contracts between men, by which the death of either through the involuntary default of others, might be made a source of splendid profits to the
other, and would also invite a system of litigation more portentous than
65
our jurisprudence has yet known.

The Michigan court, perhaps tacitly conceding that the absolute rule

against recovery works injustices in individual cases, was similarly
convinced that if the door should be opened to any recovery, intolerable excesses would follow. "If the principle [of a right to damages
for wrongful death] be once admitted, who shall prescribe its limits,
and can any limits be prescribed which would not be purely arbitrary?" 66
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE

Regardless of whether any of these factors, historical, political,
moral or practical, can be accepted as reasonable justifications for the
67
total denial of causes of actions for damages for wrongful death,
the English and American courts almost unanimously acquiesced in
the rule until nineteenth century legislation began its eventual elimination from Anglo-American common law. The negative consequences
of the application of the rule, already noted in passing, were very
broad and, judged by present standards, very harsh.
The portion of the rule based on the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona barred any action by the deceased's personal representative to recover, on behalf of the estate, damages caused by the injury
and death inflicted by the wrongdoer. This restriction operated regardless of whether the action was instituted prior to the injured
party's death. If no suit had yet been filed, the death destroyed the
cause of action; if suit had already been filed, the death of the

plaintiff anytime prior to the rendition of judgment caused the suit
to abate and be subject to dismissal. The maxim also applied to the
death of either party, and so if the defendant died while the plaintiff
was still alive suit could not be brought or continued against his
estate. The maxim operated regardless of whether the death of the
65. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., supra note 62,
at 272-73, 274. See also Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 196-97 (1867); Qrosso
v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., supra note 52, 13 Atl. at 235.
66. Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 65, at 197.
67. 1 JAGGADM, op. cit. supra note 54, at 328: "None of the many reasons
assigned for the rule has been generally accepted as satisfactory . . . . The
rule is barbarous, and rests on adjudication, in fact."

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

E[VOL. 13

injured party resulted from the injuries inflicted by the wrongdoer or
from an entirely separate and independent cause. If the plaintiff died
from natural causes or from the wrong of a third person, the right to
recover for his original injuries died with him. The maxim applied
both to the damages arising from the loss of life and to the damages
sustained between the time of the injury and the death, such as
medical expenses, physical suffering and mental anguish. The cause
of action which had already accrued for these latter damages was also
extinguished by the death.
The portion of the rule based on the Baker v. Bolton proposition
barred any action by a third party to recover damages for losses he
sustained as a result of the victim's death. Thus, relatives and dependents of the victim were left without any right of recovery for
loss of support, contributions, society, protection, guidance or comfort
which they naturally expected to receive from the decedent; nor
could they recover damages for the grief and mental anguish or
even physical sickness resulting from their bereavement. Creditors
of the deceased whose chances of ever obtaining repayment were
destroyed by the termination of the debtor's earning capacity had no
right of action against the wrongdoer for thus damaging their pecuniary interests. Insurers of the life of the deceased who were required
to make premature payments under the policies could not recover for
this financial loss. Persons with a legal right to the valuable services
of the deceased were left without any remedy against the wrongdoer
whose acts prevented them from receiving those benefits-parents of
a minor decedent, or employers or others with contract rights to the
services of an adult decedent.
IV. LnIATIONS ON THE RULE
While these phases of the rule were almost universally applied at
common law, a few limitations placed on their scope of application
by the courts may be noted. Lord Ellenborough himself clarified
one such limitation by ruling that, though a man whose wife was
killed could not recover from the killer for loss of services caused by
the wife's death, he could recover for services lost between the time
of the injury and the death subsequently resulting from the injuries.68
Thus, it was not true that the common-law rule "forbade any action
for the act or negligence which produced death," as was sometimes
contended. 9 Ellenborough's ruling was later applied to allow recovery by a father for the loss of services of his minor child between
the injury and consequent death;70 and the same result would follow
68. Baker v. Bolton, supra note 44. See Eden v. Lexington & F. R.R., 53 Ky.
165, 167 (1853).

69. See Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 65, at 184-85. (Emphasis added).
70. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.R. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 655 (1915); Mayhew v.
Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793, 794 (1885).
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in regard to a master's right of recovery for loss of services of a servant. Similarly, the father or husband was allowed to recover for
medical expenses incurred in caring for the child or wife in the
interval between injury and death.71 In none of these situations is the
recovery for losses resulting from the death of the victim, but rather
for the losses resulting from the injury of the victim and accruing to
the plaintiff prior to the death.
A second limitation, accepted by the English courts, though not
unanimously in the United States, is that the Baker case rule does
not apply to actions brought on a breach of contract theory, but only
to "cases of pure tort. ' 72 This view was applied to sustain the action
in Jackson v. Watson & Sons,7 3 in which a husband sued for damages
for breach of implied warranty of canned food which defendant sold
as fit for human consumption but which poisoned plaintiff's wife and
caused her death. In addition to medical and funeral expenses, plaintiff claimed damages for loss of his wife's services after her death and
was awarded a substantial sum on the latter basis. The Court of
Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment for plaintiff, holding
that Lord Ellenborough's ruling "only applies to cases where the
cause of action is the wrong which caused the death and does not
apply to cases where there is a cause of action independently of such
wrong."7 4 Here plaintiff had, in defendant's breach of warranty, a
cause of action wholly independent from the death of his wife, and
so the death was not the basis of the suit but entered the case only
as an element in ascertaining the damages. Though the Jackson decision has received some attention in the textbooks as limiting the
Baker rule, it is not so often noted that three years prior to that
decision a New York court in Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospita' 5 had
rejected the same reasoning, holding that the restriction against recovery of damages for wrongful death cannot be evaded by bringing
suit on a breach of contract theory. Through defendant-hospital's
negligence, plaintiff's wife had jumped from a window and been
killed while a patient in the hospital. Plaintiff sued for damages for
the loss of his wife's comfort, affection and services, alleging that
these damages had been sustained because of defendant's breach of
contract to care for the wife while she was a patient. The court
dismissed the complaint, declaring:
There seems to be no difference between the negligent breach of this
contract as alleged and the negligent breach of the contract of a common
71. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.R. v. Craft, supra note 70 (child); Mayhew v.
Burns, supra note 70 (child); Hyatt v. Adams, supra note 65 (wife).
72. See SAmaoND, TORTs 393 (11th ed. 1953).

73. [1909] 2 K.B. 193.

74. Id. at 202. See PoLLocK, ToRTs 54 (15th ed. 1951).

75. 113 App. Div. 68, 98 N.Y.S. 867 (1906), ajFfd per curiam, 192 N.Y. 580,
85 N.E. 1109 (1908).
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carrier to safely transport the passenger. In each case there is a contract, and in each case there is a tort. But the action for such a breach
is ex delicto, and not ex contractu.
Nor can we see any reason why there should be any difference in the
rule where the tortious act which caused death is alleged to be a breach
of an express contract than where it is alleged to be a breach of an
76
implied contract, or where no contractual relation at all existed.

Just as the Jackson case rejects the operation of the Baker rule in
actions for breach of contract resulting in death, so does another
7
celebrated English case, Bradshaw v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry.
exclude the application of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona in such cases. Of course, the maxim has never been thought
to apply to contract actions generally, but only to those of a personal nature such as contracts of marriage. And so after Bradshaw
had been injured in a railway accident and subsequently died from
the injuries, his personal representative was careful to base his suit
against the railroad on a breach of the contract to carry Bradshaw
safely; but the damages sought were for the medical expenses and the
lost earnings of the decedent between the time of his injury and his
death. Though defendant contended that the suit was actually for
damages for personal injuries, and so died with the injured party, the
court allowed the full recovery sought, declaring: "Whatever may be
the usual form of action in such cases, it is quite clear that the declaration in this case was framed in contract. The damage alleged was
,178 A few years later the
damage to the estate of the testator ....
Kentucky court, in a similar action brought by the deceased's administrator against a railroad company, sanctioned a right of action
for damages for the pain and suffering of the injured party prior to
his death on the reasoning that since the suit was "framed in form
79
ex contractu" death did not terminate the cause of action. Applying
the same line of reasoning to a slightly different situation, an English
court allowed a husband's administrator to bring suit for injuries that
the defendant-railroad had caused the wife to suffer prior to the husband's death. The damages claimed were for medical expenses and
the loss of services of the wife while she was injured, but the court
observed: "It is clear that this action is in substance one of contract
[of safe carriage] .... Now here there has been a breach of contract,
76. Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 75, 98 N.Y.S. at 869, 871.
77. L.R. 10 C.P. 189 (1875).

78. Id. at 193.
79. Winnegar's Adm'r v. Central Passenger Ry., 85 Ky. 547, 4 S.W. 237
(1887): "The fact that the injury finally resulted in the death of the intestate did not destroy the right of action on the contract, or for the tort growing out of it; for without the contract no liability would exist against the
company.... At common law, torts to the person survived when the action
could be framed in form ex contractu." 4 S.W. at 240. The Bradshaw case,
supra note 77, was not cited.
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which has caused a loss ...."80 However, this device for circumventing the common law maxim was decisively rejected in a New Hampshire case in which a patient brought suit against a physician for
damages for pain and suffering caused by the breach of contract to
provide treatment for a broken leg. The physician having died, the
issue was whether the cause of action would survive against his
administrator. The court determined that "whether a cause of action
survives or not does not mainly depend on the form of the remedy,
as on a tort or contract, but rather whether the damage is purely
personal, not affecting real or personal property."81 Since the loss
claimed here was of a personal nature, the court concluded that so far
as the application of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona
is concerned the case was not distinguishable from breach of marriage
contract cases.
At a much earlier date the maxim had also been discarded in
certain cases in which one person had wrongfully obtained possession
of another's property. As early as 1583, it was held that the rightful
owner of the property could sue the deceased wrongdoer's personal
representative for damages where the wrong had resulted in a benefit
to the wrongdoer's estate. 82 According to a modern statement, an
action would lie, regardless of the death of either party, (1) in
detinue to recover personal property, or (2) in ejectment to recover
possession of realty, or (3) in indebitatus assumpsit, on a fictitious
contract, for the monetary gains accruing to the wrongdoer from
83
the use of the property.
It may well be true that these qualifications to the common-law
rules barring recovery were based less on reason than on a desire to
evade the effect of the rules whenever possible, for the rules were
the subject of widespread criticism for many years prior to their
eventual legislative abrogation. 84 Pollock characterized the maxim
actio personalis moritur cum persona as "a rule which has been made
at all tolerable for a civilized country only by a series of exceptions,"
and pointed out that its effect was to benefit the wrongdoer or the
80. Potter v. Metropolitan Dist. Ry., 30 L.T.R. (n.s.) 765 (Ex. 1874).
81. Vittum v. Gilman, 48 N.H. 416, 417 (1869).

82. See Henry Sherrington's case, Say. 40, 123 Eng. Rep. 1000 (C.P. 1583). See
Vittum v. Gilman, supra note 81, at 416: "[I]f the offender acquires no gain
to himself at the expense of the sufferer, as by beating or imprisoning a man,
or by slander, the cause of action does not survive; but if by the wrong,
property is acquired by the wrong-doer whereby his estate is benefited, an
action in some form will lie against the executor to recover the value of the
property; as if the testator had converted the property wrongfully taken into
money; or the property came in specie into the hands of the executor; [citing
American cases] .... "; Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883); 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 579 (3d ed. 1923).

83. POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 74, at 52.

84. See generally Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at
Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REv. 201, 203-05
(1932).
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residuary legatee of his estate by depriving the victim or his estate
of redress for the wrong done.8 5 As long ago as 1657, a demand was
made for legislation to revise the rule that no civil action lies for
the wrongful killing of a human being, in order to allow the widow
and children of the victim to recover damages for their losses arising
from his death. 86 Then, as now, the logic of allowing damages for a
slight personal injury but denying damages for a killing, was questioned.87 This anomaly was subsequently dramatized by the grisly
humor of the facetious reports that the early railroads took precautions to insure that passengers would be killed rather than merely
injured in case of a train wreck.88 Further, the recognition of a right
of action ex contractu in the common carrier cases created a second
anomaly: If a man's wife was killed due to the railroad's negligence
while she was a passenger, no recovery could be obtained at common
law if she had purchased her own ticket; but if the husband had
bought the ticket for her, he could recover damages by suing for
breach of contract of carriage. 89
In view of their uncertain origin, their lack of logical bases, and the
harsh results they produced, one may well wonder how these restrictive rules could have so long endured. Nevertheless, the demand for
legislative reform in this field was stoutly resisted until well into the
nineteenth century, and these deeply entrenched principles finally
yielded only under the pressure of a transportation revolution so
drastic that it required revisions in the economic, social and even legal
institutions of the Anglo-American sphere.9 0
85. POLLOCK, TORTS 64-65 (13th ed. 1929).
86. See Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv.
431, 433 (1916), quoting a publication of William Shepherd, entitled "England's
Balme," at 148: "[I]t is an hard law that no recompense is given to a man's
wife or children for killing of him, whereas for the beating or wounding of
him while he was alive, he should have had recompense for the wrong."
87. Ibid; PROSSER, TORTS 710 (2d ed. 1955): "The result was that it was more
profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him." Van
Anburg v. Vicksburg, S. &P. R.R., supra note 61.
88. E.g., that Pullman passengers were carefully made to recline with their
heads toward the front of the train, and that an ax was placed in each car so
that trainmen would have a handy instrument for terminating the liability
of the railroad to those injured in an accident. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra
note 87, at 710.
89. See SALmOND, TORTS 393 (11th ed. 1953).
90. The coming of the railroad was apparently the motivation for statutes
such as Lord Campbell's Act (1846), modifying the rule against recovery for
wrongful death. See Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 192 (1867). And "the
ravages of the automobile" are credited with having stimulated the passage
of the Law Reform Act of 1934, abrogating the maxim actio personalis. See
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 378 (5th ed. 1956).
The significance of the accident experiences of the early railroads in bringing
about both survival and wrongful death legislation in the American states
is indicated by the fact that nearly all of the early cases brought under this
legislation were to recover damages for deaths caused by the negligent operation of trains. See especially the Tennessee cases, as reviewed in Davidson
Benedict Co. v. Severson, 109 Tenn. 572, 72 S.W. 967 (1903).

